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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature ofthe Case 
This case involves a 'joint real estate development venture gone awry' and has been 
pursued by an Idaho attorney and his entities against his former clients. 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Liquid Realty, Inc. ("Liquid Realty") and Wandering Trails, LLC 
("Wandering Trails") originally filed a complaint against two defendants: Big Bite Excavation, 
Inc. ("Big Bite") and Piper Ranch ("Piper Ranch") for breach of breach of contract; breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; unjust enrichment; and promissory estoppel. I 
Subsequently, the complaint was amended to include claims of alter-ego and piercing the 
corporate veil against Tim and Julie Schelhorn.2 
The district court entered summary judgment against plaintiffs on their claims against Big 
Bite.3 Subsequently, on a motion for reconsideration of a denial of summary judgment, the 
district court dismissed all claims against Tim and Julie Schelhorn.4 Piper Ranch then stipulated 
to a judgment in favor of plaintiffs. 5 
Following these events, plaintiffs purported to transfer all assets, including the appeal, to 
Schism Ablution, LLC ("Schism Ablution") who intervened as a real party in interest. Liquid 
Realty, Wandering Trails, and Schism Ablution are collectively referred to as "plaintiffs." Big 
I R. Vol. I, pp. 37-44. 
2 R. Vol. II, pp. 281-87. 
3 R. Vol. II, pp. 266-80. 
4 R. Vol. IV, pp. 707-32. 
5 R. Vol. IV, pp. 733-35. 
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Bite, Piper Ranch, and Tim and Julie Schelhorn are collectively referred to as "defendants." 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Defendants generally agree with plaintiffs' statements regarding the course of 
proceedings in this matter. Additionally, the district court denied Tim and Julie Schelhorn's 
request for attorney's fees after they were dismissed from the lawsuit.6 
C. Statement of the Facts 
Liquid Realty and Wandering Trails 
Wandering Trails is an Idaho company in which Liquid Realty is the managing member.7 
Liquid Realty is an Idaho corporation in which Mr. Thomas J. Angstman is the president and 
owner. 8 
Mr. Angstman is an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho and the 
managing member of Angstman, Johnson & Associates, PLLC {"Angstman Johnson,,).9 Mr. 
Angstman and his law firm represented Big Bite, Piper Ranch, and the Schelhorns personally in 
a number of legal matters prior to this lawsuit. 1O Angstman Johnson has represented Wandering 
Trials, LLC, Liquid Realty, and now Schism Ablution throughout this litigation. In other words, 
Mr. Angstrnan and his law firm have represented every entity and party to this lawsuit at one 
time or another. 
6 Supplemental Record ("S.R.") Vol. III, pp. 414-20. 
7 R. Vol. I, p. 10-13. 
8 R. Vol. I, p. 65-67. 
9 R. Vol. I, p. 19-21. 
10 R. Vol. I, p. 20. 
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Defendants Piper Ranch and Big Bite 
Piper Ranch is an Idaho company, formed under Idaho law, on or about March 5, 2007. 11 
The members of Piper Ranch are, and always have been, Tim Schelhorn and Julie Schelhorn. 12 
Piper Ranch properly filed its Articles of Organization with Idaho Secretary of State. 13 
Piper Ranch has properly filed its Annual Reports as required by the laws of the state of 
Idaho with the Idaho Secretary of State. 14 The Annual Reports have correctly and accurately 
listed the current members of Piper Ranch, listed the current mailing address of Piper Ranch, 
listed the proper registered agent of Piper Ranch, and stated that Piper Ranch was formed and 
organized under the laws of Idaho. Id. 
Piper Ranch's taxes are performed in a generally accepted manner and as provided by the 
Internal Revenue Service. IS 
Piper Ranch has at all times maintained a bank account separate and distinct from the 
Schelhorns' individual accounts. 16 Piper Ranch maintains a checking account at Valley 
Community Credit Union. 17 
At all times, Piper Ranch has maintained economic separateness from Tim and Julie 
Schelhorn. 18 
11 R. Vol. IV, pp. 676-80. 
12 R. Vol. IV, pp. 676-80. 
13 R. Vol. IV, pp. 676-80. 
14 R. Vol. IV, pp. 676-80. 
15 R. Vol. IV, pp. 676-80; R. Vol. III, pp. 415-19. 
16 R. Vol. IV, pp. 676-80. 
17 R. Vol. IV, pp. 676-80. 
18 R. Vol. IV, pp. 676-80. 
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Alleged Agreement between Wandering Trails and Piper Ranch 
In November 2007, Mr. Angstman, during the time in which he represented the 
Schelhoms and Big Bite, approached the Schelhoms and proposed a partnership in the 
Wandering Trails real estate development. 19 Initially, the Assignment of Limited Liability 
Company Interest was drafted in the name of Tim and Julie Schelhom individually.2o On January 
23, 2008, after a lunch meeting discussing the venture, Julie Schelhom sent an email to Mr. 
Angstman informing him of their desire to have the agreement modified to substitute Piper 
Ranch as the "Assignee" rather than Tim and Julie Schelhom.21 
Thereafter, the Assignment of Limited Liability Company Interest was changed by 
Angstman Johnson to designate Piper Ranch as the "Assignee" in the agreement.22 In February 
2008, the Assignment of Limited Liability Company Interest was executed on behalf of Liquid 
Realty, Piper Ranch, and Wandering Trails.23 None of the respective individuals signed the 
assignment in their individual capacity. 
Due to a variety of reasons, Piper Ranch did not perform the excavation work on the 
Wandering Trails project. First, the real estate market was rapidly in decline and it became 
apparent that it would cost more to pave the lots than the lots were worth?4 Additionally, there 
was no time for performance set forth in the agreement. 25 
19 R. Vol. III, p. 493; S.R. Vol. I, pp. 107-111. 
20 R. Vol. Ill, pp. 539-42. 
21 R. Vol. IV, p. 682. 
22 R. Vol. I, pp. 14-17. 
23 R. Vol.}, pp. 14-17. 
24 S.R. Vol. II, pp. 271-73. 
25 S.R. Vol. II, pp. 274-78. 
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Regardless, on May 9, 2009, Angstman withdrew from representing Big Bite in pending 
litigation and plaintiffs filed suit against defendants on May 26, 2009.26 Despite not being a party 
to the Assignment Agreement, Big Bite was named by plaintiffs as a defendant in the lawsuit.27 
Alleged Contract between Big Bite and Piper Ranch 
Tim and Julie Schelhom are shareholders of Big Bite.28 Big Bite never entered into a 
contract or agreement with Piper Ranch or Tim and Julie Schelhom with respect to the 
Wandering Trails real estate development.29 
Plaintiffs, however, included Big Bite as a party defendant from the outset under a third-
party beneficiary theory. Despite the fact that Big 'Bite was a current client of Mr. Angstman, 
absolutely no professional disclosure was made in connection with the assignment in which 
Wandering Trails claims to be a third party beneficiary.3o There is a disclosure contained within 
the assignment relating to Piper Ranch and the Schelhoms (even if there is a question of whether 
it is adequate) but no disclosure regarding potential liability of Big Bite was given by Mr. 
Angstman.31 Nowhere in the Assignment Agreement is it disclosed that Wandering Trails could 
be construed as a third-party beneficiary of a contract between Piper Ranch and Big Bite, thus 
exposing Big Bite to litigation.32 
26 R. Vol. I, p. 20 and pp. 37-44. 
27 R. Vol. I, pp. 37-44. 
28 R. Vol. I, pp. 99-104. 
29 R. Vol. I, pp. 99-104. 
30 R. Vol. I, pp. 99-104. 
31 R. Vol. I, pp. 14-17. 
32 R. Vol. I, pp. 14-17. 
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Course of Proceedings and Misconduct during the Lawsuit 
On or about December 21,2009, seven months after the initiation of the lawsuit, plaintiff 
Wandering Trails produced bates numbered documents WT 0165, WT 0166, and WT 0167.33 
WT 0165 is a Piper Ranch account statement for $228.38 drafted by Angstman Johnson on or 
about August 31, 2008 relating to Angstman Johnson's legal representation of Piper Ranch.34 
WT 0166 is a Big Bite bank check in the amount of $228.38 made payable for legal services to 
Angstman Johnson.35 WT 0167 appears to be a receipt generated by Angstman Johnson 
indicating the $228.38 was received for the Piper Ranch account.36 
Wandering Trails utilized the Angstman Johnson documents against defendants when it 
filed its Motion to Amend to include Tim and Julie Schelhom as individual parties to the lawsuit 
on March 3, 2010.37 In Wandering Trails' lvfemorandum in Support of Amended Motion to 
Amend Complaint, Wandering Trails, relying on the Angstman Johnson documents, argued that 
"Piper Ranch invoices and bills have been paid by Big Bite, a separate entity owned by the 
Schelhoms. ,,38 
Defendants promptly filed their Motion to Disqual!fY Counsel on March 8, 2010 five 
days after the Angstman Johnson documents were first utilized against its former clients Tim and 
Julie Schelhom.39 The Motion to DisqualifY Counsel was based on the fact the Defendants' 
33 S.R. Vol. II, p. 146. 
34 R. Vol. I, p. 172. 
35 R. Vol. I, p. 173. 
36 R. Vol. I, p. 174. 
37 R. Vol. I, pp. 134-36. 
38 R. Vol. II, p. 229. 
39 S.R. Vol. I, pp. 64-68. 
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fonner attorney Mr. Angstman was the only source for plaintiffs to obtain those documents 
thereby implicating the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. 
In its Order on Motion to DisqualifY Counsel, the district court noted "It is unsettling to 
this court than an attorney engaged in a 'joint business venture gone awry' litigation against a 
fonner client is being represented in the dispute by the attorney's law finn; a finn that had 
previously represented the opposing party.,,40 The district court, however, refused to grant 
defendants' Motion to disqualify Angstman Johnson and granted Plaintiffs Motion to include 
Tim and Julie Schelhorn as parties to the lawsuit.41 
Big Bite was granted summary judgment and dismissed from the action on July 14,2010 
and awarded a portion of its attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending against the plaintiffs' 
claims.42 Tim and Julie Schelhorn were dismissed from the action as a result of a Motion to 
Reconsider of the denial of summary judgment.43 The district court, however, declined to award 
the Schelhorns' attorney's fees and costs. Piper Ranch then stipulated to a judgment in favor of 
plaintiffs.44 
II. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Defendants submit the following are the issues to be considered by this Court on appeal: 
1. Whether the trial court properly granted Tim and Julie Schelhorn's Motion for 
40 S.R. Vol. I, p.132. 
41 S.R. Vol. I, pp. 1-12. 
42 R. Vol. II, pp. 266-80; R. Vol. III, pp. 380-95. 
43 R. Vol. IV, pp. 707-30. 
44 R. Vol. IV, pp. 733-35. 
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Reconsideration of the denial of summary judgment and dismissed them from the 
lawsuit. 
2. Whether the trial court properly granted Big Bite's Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
plaintiffs' claims of breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
3. Whether the trial court properly granted Big Bite's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
plaintiffs' claim of promissory estoppel. 
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion on the Order on Motion to Amend 
Complaint. 
5. Whether the trial court properly awarded Big Bite attorney's fees. 
6. Whether Schism Ablution is entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
III. 
ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL 
It is submitted that the following is at issue on cross-appeal: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding Tim and Julie Schelhorn were not prevailing 
parties and denying their request for attorney's fees. 
IV. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL AND CROSS APPEAL 
Defendants request their attorney's fees and costs associated with responding to the 
appeal and for bringing the cross-appeal pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121, Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure 54( d) and 54( e), LA.R. 41 and all other applicable state law. 
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v. 
ARGUMENT ON APPELLATE ISSUES 
A. The trial court properly denied plaintiffs' claims of alter/ego piercing the corporate 
veil and properly dismissed Tim and Julie Schelhorn as individuals from the lawsuit 
1. Standard of Review 
Summary judgment under LR.C.P. 56(c) is proper only when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, this 
Court exercises free review in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and 
whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.45 When assessing a motion 
for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the 
nonmoving party. Furthermore, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 
party resisting the motion.46 
The party moving for summary judgment initially carries the burden to establish that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.47 The burden may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the 
nonmoving party will be required to prove at tria1.48 Such an absence of evidence may be 
established either by an affirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence or by a 
review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that such proof of an element is 
45 Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., III Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279,1280 (Ct.App. 1986). 
46 G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851,854 (1991); Sanders v. KunaJoint 
School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App. 1994). 
47 Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct.App. 1992). 
48 Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475, 478 (Ct.App. 1994). 
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lacking.49 Once such an absence of evidence has been established, the burden then shifts to the 
party opposing the motion to show, via further depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, 
that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so 
'0 under LR.C.P. 56(f).) 
The United States Supreme Court, in interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56( c), 
which is identical in all relevant aspects to I.R.C.P. 56(c), stated: 
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56( c) mandates the entry of summary 
judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who 
fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 
essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof 
at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," 
since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the 
nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The 
moving party is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" because the nonmoving 
party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case 
with respect to which she has the burden of proof. 5 1 
The language and reasoning of Celotex has been adopted in Idaho. 52 
2. Plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of material fact with respect to their claims of alter-
ego and piercing the corporate veil 
Tim and Julie Schelhorn ("the Schelhorns") prevailed against plaintiffs' claims of alter-
ego and piercing the corporate veil due to the economic separateness of the Schelhorns and their 
entities. Despite the economic separateness, plaintiffs sought to hold the Schelhorns personally 
liable for the debts and/or obligations of Piper Ranch. 
49 Heath v. Honker~5 Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct.App. 2000). 
50 Sanders, 125 Idaho at 874,876 P.2d at 156. 
51 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265,273-74 (1986) 
(citations omitted). 
52 Dunnick, 126 Idaho at 312,882 P.2d at 479. 
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The obligations and liabilities of members of a limited liability company for the acts of 
the company are governed by Idaho Code § 30-6-304 which states: 
Liability of members and managers.--(l) The debts, obligations or other 
liabilities of a limited liability company, whether arising in contract, tort or 
otherwise: 
(a) Are solely the debts, obligations or other liabilities of the company, 
and 
(b) Do not become the debts, obligations or other liabilities of a member 
or manager solely for the reason of the member acting as a member or 
manager acting as manager. 
(2) The failure of a limited liability company to observe any particular formalities 
relating to the exercise of its powers or management of its activities is not a 
ground for imposing liability on the members or managers for the debts, 
obligations or other liabilities of the company.53 
The Official Comment to this section states that this paragraph "shields members and 
managers only against the debts, obligations and liabilities of the limited liability company and is 
irrelevant to claims seeking to hold a member or manager directly liable on account of the 
member's or manager's own conduct.,,54 The Official Comment gives three examples of attempts 
to hold a manager or member liable for their own conduct: 1) a manager who personally 
guarantees an obligation; 2) a manager who attempts to bind a company without authority to do 
so; and 3) a manager who commits a tort against a third party.55 
The Official Comment also recognizes the difference between "limited liability 
companies" and "corporations." It is recognized that subsection (b )(2) pertains specifically to 
claims of piercing the corporate veil which is at issue in this case. The Official Comment states: 
This subsection pertains to the equitable doctrine of 'piercing the veil' - i.e., 
53 Idaho Code § 30-6-304 (emphasis added). 
54 Idaho Code § 30-6-304, Official Comment. 
55 Id. 
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conflating an entity and its owners to hold one liable for the obligations of the 
other. The doctrine of 'piercing the corporate veil' is well-established, and courts 
regularly (and sometimes almost reflexively) apply that doctrine to limited 
liability companies. In the corporate realm, "disregard of corporate formalities" is 
a key factor in the piercing analysis. In the realm of LLCs, that factor is 
inappropriate, because informality of organization and operation is both 
common and desired. 56 
The Official Comment cites an example of members of an LLC who do not conform to a 
requirement in the Operating Agreement relating to monthly meetings. The Official Comment 
makes clear that "Under subsection (b)(2), that fact is irrelevant to a piercing claim.,,57 Thus, the 
only factor that is relevant under the standard "'corporate' piercing analysis is whether the LLC 
has maintained 'economic separateness.' ,,58 
While the former version of the Idaho Uniform Limited Liability Company Act may not 
be at issue here as Piper Ranch opted to be bound by the amendments to the Idaho Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act effective July 1, 2008,59 the comments to the revised version 
draw a distinction between corporations and limited liability companies that is applicable in this 
case. The intent and desire of an LLC is to be less formal than a corporation. In other words, the 
principals and reasoning addressed in the comments to the new act surely apply to the current 
case. 
As demonstrated below, the Schelhoms provided to the trial court undisputed evidence of 
the economic separateness that exists between themselves and Piper Ranch. 
56 [d. (emphasis added). 
57 [d. 
58 [d. 
59 R. Vol. IV, p. 677. 
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a. The Schelhorns and Piper Ranch properly filed their tax returns 
Plaintiffs first argue that defendants improperly file their tax returns. Despite the 
allegations of plaintiffs, Piper Ranch presented undisputed evidence that it properly filed its 
federal and state tax returns through the sworn testimony of Certified Public Accountant Teresa 
Pulliam.6o Specifically, Ms. Pulliam testified that the tax returns were filed in a generally 
accepted manner as provided by the Internal Revenue Service.61 Plaintiffs produced no expert 
witness, evidence or testimony to rebut the statements of Ms. Pulliam or that would establish any 
impropriety with the manner Piper Ranch and the Schelhorns file annual taxes.62 
Ms. Pulliam's testimony is consistent with the Idaho Uniform Limited Liability Company 
Act and United States Treasury Regulations recognize that any LLC may elect to file taxes as a 
partnership, disregarded entity, or corporation. That decision, however, does not affect the status 
of the LLC nor does it in any way tend to show that an LLC is not maintaining "economic 
separateness" from its members. 
The preface to the Idaho Uniform Limited Liability Company Act states: 
In 1997, the tax classification context changed radically, when the IRS 'check-
the-box' regulations became effective. Under those regulations, an 
'unincorporated' business entity is taxed either as a partnership or disregarded 
entity (depending upon the status of the owners) unless it elects to be taxed as a 
corporation. Exceptions exist (e.g., entities whose interests are publicly-traded), 
but, in general, tax classifications concerns no longer constrain the structure of 
LLCs and the content of LLC statutes. Single-member LLCs, once suspect 
because novel and of uncertain tax status, are now popular both for sole 
60 R. Vol. III, pp. 415-16. 
61 R. Vol. III, pp. 416. 
62 R. Vol. IV, p. 725 (the trial court noted "that in neither the initial motion for summary judgment, nor in the 
response to the motion for reconsideration have the Plaintiffs addressed this issue with any specific facts or authority 
that contradicts the evidence set forth in the Affidavit of Teresa Pulliam.") 
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proprietorships and as corporate subsidiaries.63 
This is consistent with United States Treasury Regulation 301.7701-1(a)(4) which states: 
(4) Single owner organizations. Under sections 301.7701-2 and 301.7701-3, 
certain organizations that have a single owner can choose to be recognized or 
disregarded as entities separate from their owners. 64 
Based on this undisputed evidence, the trial court found the manner in which the 
Schelhorns and Piper Ranch file annual tax returns fails to raise a material fact with respect to 
the economic separateness maintained between the individuals and the entity. 65 
b. Piper Ranch maintained a separate bank account 
Next, defendants argue that the Schelhorns and Piper Ranch failed to maintain economic 
separateness because Piper Ranch failed to maintain a bank account separate from the 
Schelhorns.66 That assertion is false. 
Piper Ranch maintains its own bank account at Valley Community Credit Union.67 The 
name on the account is Tim Schelhorn, Julie Schelhorn, dba, Piper Ranch.68 Utilizing the term 
'dba' on the account was a matter of internal bank policy rather than an indication of how the 
account was handled.69 It is undisputed that the account has been at all times maintained for the 
benefit of Piper Ranch and has been kept separate from the accounts of Tim and Julie Schelhorn 
63 Official Comment, Prefatory Note, to Idaho Code § 30-6-301 et seq., the Idaho Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act (emphasis added). 
64 United States Treasury Regulation 301.770 I-I (a)( 4). 
65 R. Vol. IV, p. 723. 
66 Appellant's Brief, pp. 21-22. 
67 R. Vol. IV, pp. 676-81. 
68 R. Vol. IV, pp. 684-85. 
69 R. Vol. IV, pp. 676-81. 
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individually.70 The checks drawn on this account clearly state that the account is that of Piper 
Ranch as Tim and Julie Schelhorn do not appear on the checks.71 Further, as described below, 
the Schelhorns do not use Piper Ranch funds to pay for personal expenses.72 
Again, the district court correctly noted that plaintiffs utterly failed to present any 
evidence to raise an issue of material fact with respect to the Piper Ranch bank account. "There 
was no evidence the Schelhorns regularly deposited their income from other business activities 
in the account or that they used the account for personal purposes such as paying for insurance, 
vehicle maintenance, entertainment, purchasing personal goods, salaries or for paying other 
unrelated personal obligations." 73 
Because plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of material fact with respect to the issue, the 
trial court's decision granting defendants summary judgment was proper. 
c. Mr. Angstman's improper use of the Big Bite Excavation, Inc. check to his law firm 
does not raise an issue of material fact 
The 'feather in the cap' for plaintiffs at the trial court has been interestingly glossed over 
III the Appellant's Brief the improper documents obtained from the Schelhorns' former 
attorneys at Angstman Johnson. 
Defendants strongly maintain that the plaintiffs' use of these documents against their 
former clients constitutes misconduct and that they should not be considered in the economic 
separateness analysis. Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(c) unequivocally states: 
70 I R. Vo. IV, pp. 676-81. 
71 R. Vol. IV, p. 687. 
72 R. Vol. IV, pp. 676-81. 
73 R. Vol. IV, p. 724. 
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A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or 
former firm has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter: 
(l) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage 
of the former client except as these Rules would permit or require with 
respect to a client, or when the information has become generally 
known ... 74 
Throughout the litigation, plaintiffs contested the confidential nature of the Angstman 
Johnson documents and Big Bite check. The prohibition against use of information against 
former clients, however, is in no way dependent upon whether the information is "confidential" 
or protected by attorney-client privilege. The Rule does not say that the lawyer shall not USy 
"confidential" information against a client. There is no way for plaintiffs or Mr. Angstman to 
argue that the information in question has become "generally known." There is no indication on 
the check itself that Big Bite's account was being accidently used to pay a Piper Ranch invoice. 
Thus, any argument that by submitting the check through normal banking channels made the 
information "generally known" fails. Rather, plaintiffs and Mr. Angstman are using information 
that they discovered only through the course of their legal representation of the defendants 
against those defendants now. Such conduct should not be tolerated or accepted by this Court. 
The timing of the Big Bite check must also be examined. At the time, Piper Ranch, Big 
Bite, and the Schelhorns were clients of Mr. Angstman and his law firm. This at least raises 
questions regarding the duty of Mr. Angstman to have brought to his clients' attention the 
mistake and an opportunity to correct it before cashing the check to his own benefit. 
Even if the check identified by Plaintiffs is considered, this evidence amounts to no more 
74 I.R.P.C. 1.9(c) (emphasis added). 
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than a scintilla of evidence. Julie Schelhom's uncontested testimony is that paying the Angstman 
Johnson with a Big Bite check was an "oversight.,,75 That oversight has been corrected.76 Over 
the course of more than four years, Plaintiffs have only produced one check from Big Bite 
paying a $228.38 Piper Ranch invoice. This is simply insufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the Schelhoms were utilizing Piper Ranch funds to 
pay for personal expenses. 
The trial court correctly concluded that even if the documents were to be considered, the 
Angstman Johnson documents constitute no more than a scintilla of evidence. Therefore, the trial 
court's finding that summary judgment was proper on the piercing the corporate veil claim 
should be upheld. 
d No requirement exists for Piper Ranch to adopt a company resolution authorizing Big 
Bite Excavation, Inc. to perform services on the 'Circle Z'project 
Plaintiffs next argue the absence of a Piper Ranch 'corporate resolution' authorizing Big 
Bite to perform services on the Circle Z project is evidence that Piper Ranch is merely a conduit 
for personal business ventures. 
This argument is a red herring because there is no requirement in the Idaho Uniform 
Limited Liability Company Act for limited liability companies to adopt resolutions to conduct 
business or take corporate action. Plaintiffs do not cite to any authority for their contention that 
such a resolution is required. 
Moreover, the district court properly noted that there was essentially no evidence 
75 R. VoL lV, pp. 676-693. 
76 R. VoL lV, pp. 676-696. 
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provided that would raise an issue of fact regarding lack of corporate formalities or lack of 
economic separateness on this issue.77 Plaintiffs did not provide any contract related to the Circle 
Z transaction to the court. 78 No evidence was presented that Piper Ranch even entered into an 
agreement.79 There was no evidence presented that Piper Ranch obtained an interest in the 
project.80 There was no evidence presented that Piper Ranch incurred any debt related to the 
project.8l There was no evidence presented that Piper Ranch paid any expenses related to the 
project. 82 
In short, plaintiffs failed to provide any "meaningful relevant evidence that the line of 
separation between Piper Ranch and the Schelhoms has been compromised." As such, the 
district court correctly found plaintiffs' "assertion that Piper Ranch is simply a conduit for 
conducting business ventures is conclusory and argumentative having no legal significance to 
this decision absent the presentation of meaningful relevant evidence ... ,,83 Because of the utter 
lack of evidence provided, plaintiffs have failed to raise an issue of material fact with respect to 
this issue and the district court's determination should be upheld. 
e. Plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of material jact regarding Undercapitalization and 
Inequitable result 
Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs have failed to raise an issue of material fact with 
respect to the economic separateness or unity of interest prong of a piercing the corporate veil 
77 R. Vol. IV, p. 722. 
78 R. Vol. IV, p. 722. 
79 R. Vol. IV, p. 722. 
80 R. Vol. IV, p. 722. 
81 R. Vol. IV, p. 722. 
82 R. Vol. IV, p. 722. 
83 R. Vol. IV, p. 723. 
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claim. Thus, there is no need to analyze the "inequitable result" prong of the test. 84 Even if this 
Court were to analyze that prong, however, it is clear that plaintiffs have failed to raise an issue 
of fact with respect to any 'injustice' resulting from treating the Schelhoms separately from Piper 
Ranch. 
The district court correctly noted that plaintiffs failed to present any evidence to 
demonstrate "deception, misrepresentation of assets or fraudulent conduct by Piper Ranch, LLC. 
There were no representations by Piper Ranch, LLC as to its assets or financial health. There is 
no evidence that any Piper Ranch, LLC assets were surreptitiously transferred out of entity 
ownership or improperly consumed.,,85 
The Schelhoms also provided un-rebutted evidence that they planned to make capital 
contributions as necessary to cover their contribution had the project gone forward. 86 Moreover, 
the district court properly recognized that even if Piper Ranch never had an amount of money in 
the bank account equal to the value of the project does not evidence undercapitalization. Further, 
Piper Ranch immediately gained the asset of a 25% interest in Wandering Trails.87 
Moreover, plaintiffs cannot argue that it is inequitable to maintain Piper Ranch and the 
Schelhoms are separate. As noted above, the Assignment was originally drafted by Angstman 
Johnson in the name of Tim and Julie Schelhom as individuals.88 The Schelhoms specifically 
84 See Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547,165 P.3d 261 (2007). 
85 R. Vol. IV, p. 728. 
86 R. Vol. IV, p. 728. 
87 R. Vol. IV, p. 728. 
88 R. Vol. III, p. 483. 
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negotiated the change to Piper Ranch.89 It cannot be seriously argued that Mr. Angstman - a 
licensed Idaho attorney who had represented the Schelhorns, Piper Ranch and Big Bite was 
ignorant as to the effect and potential consequence of that requested change. This is especially 
true in light of the multitude of entities in this litigation controlled and managed by Mr. 
Angstman. 
Quite simply, it cannot be said that equity swings in favor of an experienced attorneylreal 
estate agent/real estate broker who chooses to enter into an agreement with an entity managed by 
his current and former clients. This is especially true when the attorney/real estate agent/real 
estate broker chooses to sue entities and individuals who were not parties to the agreement. 
Further, it is undisputed that plaintiffs knew they were entering into an agreement with Piper 
Ranch as opposed to Tim and Julie Schelhorn. Thus, plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence to 
support a finding that dismissing the Schelhorns would promote fraud or injustice. 
Because plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence that would raise an issue of material 
fact with respect to 'injustice,' the district court's ruling granting defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be upheld. 
3. Plaintiffs incorrectly argue that the comments to the Idaho Uniform Limited Liability 
Company Act invade the province of the court in an apparent effort to sidestep the 
plain language of the law 
Plaintiffs next argue that the comments to the Idaho Uniform Limited Liability Company 
Act be disregarded because they invade the province and constitutional authority of the 
89 R. Vol. III, pp. 539-42. 
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· d" 90 JU lClary. 
Despite the arguments of the plaintiffs, neither Idaho Code § 30-6-304 nor its official 
comments invade upon the judiciary's power to promulgate rules of procedure. Rather, the law 
and the official comments analyze the substantive relevance of corporate formalities. In passing 
Idaho Code § 30-6-304, the legislature did not delve into drafting rules of civil procedure or 
evidence. Corporations, limited liability companies, and other corporate entities are by nature 
creatures of statute and the legislature is well within is authority to legislate and regulate the 
boundaries and extent of corporate protections to members and managers. 
Clearly, the Idaho Uniform Limited Liability Company Act and the accompanymg 
comments are not favorable to plaintiffs' position. In fact, the comments illustrate the fact that 
the Limited Liability Company is designed to reduce and/or eliminate the formalities required of 
corporations. That was the plain intent in the creation of limited liability companies. 
Finally, Public Policy dictates that the Idaho Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
and its comments should be held valid and enforceable. As stated above, corporations and 
limited liability companies are creatures of statute and, as such, the legislature has the authority 
to set forth the legal requirements and conditions for these entities. Business owners, individuals, 
and entrepreneurs rely upon the codified laws establishing these entities and utilize them as the 
benchmark for the operation of their businesses. 
It would be inequitable to punish those who have properly followed the rules and laws set 
forth in the Idaho Uniform Limited Liability Company Act by allowing personal liability of 
90 Appellant's Brief, p. 15. 
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owners and members where economic separateness has been maintained. If continued expansion 
and creation of small businesses is desired, preservation of the protection of members is vital. As 
such, public policy necessitates Tim and Julie Schelhorn be protected from individual liability. 
Therefore, the district court properly dismissed them from the lawsuit. 
B. The trial court properly granted Big Bite Excavation, Inc.'s Motion for Summary 
Judgment on plaintiffs' claims of breach of contract and breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing 
1. Standard of Review 
The same standard of review relating to summary judgment detailed above is applicable 
on the issue as well and for the sake of brevity, will not be repeated here. 
2. Plaintiffs failed to raise a material fact with respect to their contractual claims against 
Big Bite Excavation, Inc. 
Defendant Big Bite prevailed on a motion for summary judgment on the claims of breach 
of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiffs alleged 
that Wandering Trails was a third-party beneficiary of a contract between Piper Ranch and Big 
Bite. Because plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact 
with respect to the existence of a contract between Piper Ranch and Big Bite, the district court's 
determination should be upheld. 
In order for a party to succeed on a breach of contract claim, there must first be a valid 
and enforceable contract. In order for a contract to be enforceable it "must be complete, definite 
and certain in all of its material terms, or contain provisions which are capable in themselves of 
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being reduced to certainty.,,91 
a. Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence of a contract between Piper Ranch and Big 
Bite Excavation,' Inc. 
In order for Wandering Trails and/or Liquid Realty to be a third-party beneficiary, a 
contract must have existed between Big Bite and Piper Ranch. Because no contract between Big 
Bite and Piper Ranch existed, summary judgment was proper. 
The uncontroverted testimony of Tim and Julie Schelhom establishes that Big Bite did 
not enter into an agreement with Piper Ranch regarding the Wandering Trails project and that it 
did not perform work or services for Piper Ranch.92 On that basis, Big Bite moved for summary 
judgment.93 
At oral argument on the matter, counsel for plaintiffs conceded that there was no written 
contract between Big Bite and Piper Ranch and that they were instead relying on an oral 
'implied' contract between Piper Ranch and Big Bite. Mr. Angstman's affidavit alleges that Tim 
Schelhom stated that Big Bite would perform the work contemplated in the Assignment 
Agreement.94 This sole alleged statement is the entire basis for plaintiffs' contractual claims 
against defendants. 
There are several problems with plaintiffs' argument on this point. First, the allegations 
contained in Mr. Angstman's affidavit, even taken as true, simply do not amount to a contract 
between Big Bite and Piper Ranch. That is because the alleged agreement is not complete and 
91 P.o. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 238, 159 P.3d 870,875 (2007) (citing 
Giacobbi Square v. PEK Corp., 105 Idaho 346, 348, 670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983)). 
92 R. Vol. I, pp. 63-64; pp. 99-101. 
93 R. Vol. I, pp. 55-56. 
94 R. Vol. rI, p. 276. 
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the terms are not capable of being reduced to certainty.95 
Moreover, it was undisputed that Big Bite could not perform the pavmg work 
contemplated by the Assignment Agreement. Big Bite's specialty is excavation - not paving.96 
Big Bite had performed grading work in the past, but such work is not its specialty.97 Moreover, 
Big Bite had never performed paving work nor did it have the necessary equipment to perform 
paving work.98 This is further evidence that there was no contractual obligation for Big Bite to 
perform the work contemplated by the Assignment Agreement. 
Finally, plaintiffs asked the court to determine the parties' intent by looking outside the 
four comers of the Assignment Agreement, which it properly refused to do. The evidence at 
issue are the affidavits of Mr. Angstman, Mr. Mick Bernier and Mrs. Debra Bernier and the 
alleged statements of Tim Schelhorn that Big Bite would perform the excavation and paving 
work on the Wandering Trials project.99 The statement was allegedly made contemporaneously 
to the execution of the Assignment Agreement although the Bernier affidavits are not specific as 
to the timing of the statements. IOO 
The district court properly found that the alleged statement and affidavits do not raise an 
issue of fact because the Assignment Agreement was found to be clear and unambiguous stating 
that Piper Ranch agrees to "pay for or otherwise arrange for work to be done."IOI The 
95 Lawrence v. Jones, 124 Idaho 748, 750-751, 864 P.2d 194, 196- I 97 (Idaho App., I 993). 
96 R. Vol. I, pp. 189-90. 
97 R. Vol. I, pp. 189-90. 
98 R. Vol. I, pp. 189-90. 
99 R. Vol. II, p. 272; p. 274. 
100 R. Vol. II, p. 274. 
Wi R. Vol. II, p. 274-75. 
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contradictory contemporaneous statement was thus inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. 102 
Based on the undisputed facts, the trial correctly found a "complete lack of evidence in 
the record that any of the parties intended to form a contract, oral or written, that would bind Big 
Bite Excavation, Inc. to perform the obligations of Piper under the Assignment Agreement." 
b. Plaintiffs failed to prove that Wandering Trails was a third party beneficiary of any 
alleged agreement 
As shoWfl above, plaintiffs failed to introduce any evidence of a contract binding Big Bite 
to perform the obligations of Piper Ranch under the Assignment Agreement. Absent such 
evidence, it is impossible for Wandering Trails to be a third-party beneficiary. 
Even so, the district court addressed this issue and correctly concluded that Wandering 
Trails failed to raise an issue of fact regarding its theory of third-party beneficiary. 103 Idaho Code 
§ 29-102 states that "[a] contract, made expressly for the benefit of a third person, may be 
enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it." (emphasis added). This Court 
has found that "One may be a direct beneficiary under a contract of guaranty, or he may be a 
mere incidental beneficiary. If he belongs to the former class he may recover, but if to the latter 
he may not.,,104 Further, one may not recover under a third-party beneficiary theory "unless it 
may be concluded from the instrument that the parties thereto regarded him as the person 
primarily interested and that they desired and intended to secure him personally the benefits of 
. .. ,,105 
Its prOVISIOns. 
102 R. Vol. II, p. 275-76. 
103 R. Vol. II, p. 277. 
104 Dawson v. Eldredge, 84 Idaho 331,337372 P.2d 414,418 (1962). 
105 !d. 
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In Nelson v. Anderson Lumber Co., the Court of Appeals stated: "In order for a third 
party beneficiary to recover on a breach of contract claim, the third party must show that the 
contract was made for his or her direct benefit and that he or she is more than a mere incidental 
beneficiary. The contract itself must express an intent to benefit the third party."J06 
The court in Nelson described the third party beneficiary, and whether he may recover, 
using an owner, general contractor, and subcontractor illustration from a treatise on contract law 
that is directly applicable to this case: 
Such contracts [between a principal contractor and subcontractors] are 
made to enable the principal contractor to perform; and their performance by the 
subcontractor does not itself discharge the principal contractor's duty to the owner 
with whom he has contracted. The installation of plumbing fixtures or the 
construction of cement floors by a subcontractor is not a discharge of the principal 
contractor's duty to the owner to deliver a finished building containing those 
items; and if after their installation the undelivered building is destroyed by fire, 
the principal contractor must replace them for the owner, even though he must 
pay the subcontractor in full and has no right that the latter shall replace them. It 
seems, therefore, that the owner has no right against the subcontractor, in the 
absence of clear words to the contrary. The owner is neither a creditor beneficiary 
nor a done beneficiary; the benefit that he receives from the performance must be 
regarded as merely incidentaL 107 
Similarly in this case, even assuming that a contract existed, Plaintiffs would be at most 
incidental beneficiaries and unable to recover against Big Bite. Under the above illustration, 
Wandering Trails and Liquid Realty are the owners of the Wandering Trails property. Piper 
Ranch would be the principal contractor and Big Bite would potentially be a subcontractor. Any 
contract between Piper Ranch and Big Bite would be "made to enable the principal contractor to 
perform." However, as described above, Idaho law is clear that the "owner has no right against 
106 140 Idaho 702, 99 P.3d 1092 (Ct.App. 2004) (emphasis added). 
107 !d. at 710 (citing 9 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 779D (1979)) (emphasis added). 
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the subcontractor.,,108 In other words, plaintiffs in this case would be no more than incidental 
beneficiaries of a contract between Piper Ranch and Big Bite. As such, they simply cannot 
recover under a third party beneficiary theory. 
In this case, as the district court correctly noted, plaintiffs did not corne forth with any 
evidence that would raise an issue of material fact with respect to a contract between Piper 
Ranch and Big Bite. Further, there was no evidence presented that would indicate Wandering 
Trails was the intended beneficiary of such an agreemenL lO9 
On appeal, plaintiffs have failed to point to any evidence that would support overturning 
the district court's decision granting Big Bite summary judgment on the contractual claims 
levied against it. Therefore, the district court's Order on Big Bite Excavation, Inc. 's August 6, 
2009 Motion for Summary Judgment should be upheld. 
c. Big Bite Excavation, Inc. was not a party to the Assignment Agreement 
By its plain terms, Big Bite was not a party to the Assignment Agreement. 110 Further, 
there is no disclosure contained in the Assignment Agreement (or in any other document) that 
fully explains Mr. Angstman's role in the transaction or that Big Bite could be subjected to 
liability (by its own attorney) on account of the Assignment entered into by Piper Ranch. 
The position adopted by plaintiffs places Mr. Angstman in an ethical 'catch-22.' On the 
one hand, he wants to claim certain duties and obligations are owed to him and/or his entities by 
Big Bite and on the other hand, wants to disclaim any duty to ethically inform Big Bite of 
108 Id. 
109 R. Vol. II, pp. 277-78. 
110 R. Vol. I, pp. 69-72. 
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potential legal consequences of Piper Ranch signing the Assignment Agreement. 
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(a) states: 
A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly 
acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a 
client unless: 
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest 
are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and 
transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood 
by the client; 
(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is 
given a reasonable opportunity to seek advice of independent legal 
counsel on the transaction; and 
(3) the client gives informed consent, in writing signed by the client, to 
the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the 
transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in 
the transaction. 
From this rule, several requirements of the lawyer may be gleaned. First, the transaction 
itself must be fair to the client. Second, the client must be informed of the terms of the 
transaction in writing. Third, the client must give informed consent, in writing, to the essential 
terms of the transaction as well as the lawyer's role in the transaction. These requirements are 
reiterated in the comments to the Rule which state: 
Paragraph (a)(l) requires that the transaction itself be fair to the client and that its 
essential terms be communicated to the client, in writing, in a manner that can be 
reasonably understood. 
Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer obtain the client's informed consent, in a 
writing signed by the client, both to the essential terms of the transaction and to 
the lawyer's role. l1l 
This Court has held that "[t]he relationship of client and attorney is one of trust, binding an . 
111 IDAHO RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 1.8, cmt [2] (2004). 
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attorney to the utmost good faith in fair dealing with his client and obligating the attorney to 
discharge that trust with complete fairness, honor, honesty, loyalty, and fidelity. For a breach or 
violation of those professional duties, the client may hold the attorney liable or accountable." I 12 
Clearly, Mr. Angstman failed to comply with the requirements of Idaho Rule of 
Professional Conduct 1.8. Specifically, Mr. Angstman failed to inform Big Bite, in writing or 
otherwise, that the transaction between Piper Ranch and Wandering Trails would potentially 
subject Big Bite to liability.l13 Mr. Angstman failed to inform Big Bite that (in his view) 
Wandering Trails was a third-party beneficiary, which, according to Mr. Angstman, is an 
essential term of the transaction. 114 Mr. Angstman failed to inform Big Bite of his and 
Wandering Trails' role of a third-party beneficiary. I IS Mr. Angstman failed to obtain a writing 
signed by his client, Big Bite 116 These assertions were never disputed by Mr. Angstman. Idaho 
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8 specifically states that the transaction is prohibited unless all of 
these requirements are met. 
According to Mr. Angstman's affidavits filed in this case, he was fully aware that he 
and/or Wandering Trails were express third-party beneficiaries. Relevant admissions by Mr. 
Angstman include: 
-In connection with finalizing the Assignment Agreement and prior to signing it, I 
had a meeting where both Tim and Julie were present. At the time of the meeting, 
I knew that Tim and Julie were the sole shareholders and officers of Big Bite. 
112 Blough v. Wellman, 132 Idaho 424, 426,974 P.2d 70 (1999) (citing Beal v. Mars Larsen Ranch Corp., Inc., 99 
Idaho 662, 667, 586 P.2d 1378, 1383 (1978)). 
113 R. Vol. 1,99-104. 
114 R. Vol. 1,99-104. 
lIS R. Vol. 1,99-104. 
116 R. Vol. I, pp. 99-104. 
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-At that meeting Tim indicated that Big Bite would perform the excavation and 
paving work required by and contemplated in the Assignment Agreement. Tim 
and Julie both stated that the purpose of Big Bite performing the work was to 
satisfY the obligations to WT and LRI, pursuant to the Assignment Agreement. I 17 
From Mr. Angstman's affidavit, it is clear that Mr. Angstman contends that he knew that 
he was entering into a business relationship with a current client, Big Bite. Further, Angstman is 
of the position that the involvement of Big Bite was an essential term of the transaction. Again, 
Rule I.8(a) requires that the client give informed consent, "in a writing signed by the client, to 
the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction ... " (emphasis 
added). However, nowhere does Mr. Angstman allege that he informed Big Bite (an entity and 
former client that he is attempting to hold responsible for his losses) that the transaction between 
Piper Ranch and Wandering Trails would carry with it any potential liability for Big Bite. The 
only writing produced with regard to the necessary disclosures is the Assignment of Limited 
Liability Company Interest (hereinafter, "Assignment Agreement"). While the Assignment 
Agreement was produced to the Schelhoms as members of Piper Ranch, it does specifically 
acknowledge that both the Schelhoms and Big Bite are clients of Angstman. Additionally, the 
Assignment Agreement advises the parties to seek independent legal advice and gives the parties 
reasonable opportunity to do so, in compliance with Rule 1.8. These disclosures are clearly 
required under I.R.P .C. 1.8. However, the Assignment Agreement is still deficient in the 
following areas. 
The Assignment Agreement is signed by Tim and Julie Schelhom as members of Piper 
117 R. Vol. I, pp. 65-68. 
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Ranch only. There is no indication that they were signing on behalf of Big Bite, which is a 
separate legal entity. A vvTiting signed by Big Bite is required under Idaho Rule of Professional 
Conduct 1.8. Further, there is no written disclosure of the essential term that 
AngstmanJWandering Trails would be a third-party beneficiary in any contract between Piper 
Ranch and Wandering Trails. In fact, the role of AngstmanJWandering Trails as a third party 
beneficiary was never disclosed. Stated differently, it was never disclosed to the Schelhorns, 
Piper Ranch, or Big Bite that AngstmanJWandering Trails would be a third-party beneficiary to a 
contract between Piper Ranch and Big Bite. Most importantly, the consequences of that 
relationship, including any potential liability of Big Bite, were never disclosed to Big Bite 
through its attorney, Mr. Angstman. 
The fact that the potential consequences in the transaction were never disclosed to Big 
Bite is further evidence that it was never intended that Big Bite be responsible for the alleged 
obligations of Piper Ranch. Alternatively, the transaction is void because of Mr. Angstman's 
failure to abide by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. Regardless, the district court's 
determination that plaintiffs failed to raise an issue of material fact that would indicate Big Bite 
was a party to the Assignment Agreement should be upheld. 
C. The trial court properly granted Big Bite Excavation, Inc.'s Motion for Summary 
Judgment on plaintiffs' claim of promissory estoppel 
1. Standard of Review 
The same standard of review relating to summary judgment detailed above is applicable 
on the issue as well and for the sake of brevity, will not be repeated here. 
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2. Plaintiffs failed to raise an Issue of material fact with respect to their claim for 
promissory estoppel 
Despite raising the district court's decision on plaintiffs' promissory estoppel claim as 
issue three in the Appellant's Brief, plaintiffs provide no substantive argument on this issue. 
Therefore, plaintiffs have waived this issue on appeal. 
To the extent this Court considers the district court's decision on promissory estoppel, 
that decision should be upheld. As this Court noted in Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass 'n, 
promissory estoppel is "a substitute for consideration, not a substitute for an agreement between 
the parties." I 18 
In this case, plaintiffs suffer from the same problem as the plaintiff in Lettunich - lack of 
an agreement. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' promissory estoppel 
claim because of a lack of "evidence of any agreement binding Big Bite to perform Piper 
Ranch's obligations under the Assignment Agreement." I 19 
D. The district court's ruling on plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Leave to Amend 
should be upheld 
On July 14, 2010, the district court entered its Order on Motion to Amend. l2O There, the 
district court denied the plaintiffs' request to include claims of alter-ego and piercing the 
corporate veil against Piper Ranch only.121 As to Big Bite, the court stated it "has on this date 
entered a separate order granting Big Bites [sic] Motion for Summary Judgment that will result 
in the dismissal of Wandering Trails' claims against Big Bite and therefore rendering moot any 
liS R. Vol. II, p. 278 (citing Lettunich v. Key Bank Nat. Ass 'n, 141 Idaho 362, 109 P3d 1104 (2005). 
119 R. Vol. II, p. 278. 
120 R. Vol. 281-86. 
121 R. Vol. 285-86. 
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claims regarding piercing the Big Bite, Inc. corporate veil as contained in the proposed amended 
I · ,,122 comp amt. 
Despite the ruling from the district court, plaintiffs filed the amended complaint including 
the piercing claim against Big Bite123 Rather than objecting, plaintiffs requested clarification of 
the order. 124 The Court then reiterated its ruling that the claim was essentially made moot by the 
granting of summary judgment because no evidence was presented that would allow a finding of 
"a unity of interest or ownership between Piper Ranch and Big Bite.,,125 
1. Standard of Review 
As the district court correctly noted in the Order on Motion to Amend, a court's decision 
to grant or deny a motion to amend is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. 126 In 
making the decision, the court may consider "whether the amended pleading sets out a valid 
claim, whether the opposing party would be prejudiced by any undue delay, or whether the 
opposing party has an available defense to the newly added claim.,,127 
2. Plaintiffs have failed to show the district court abused its discretion 
In the Appellant's Brief, plaintiffs first argue that the district court abused its discretion 
because he "did not expressly state his ruling on the motion was one of discretion.,,128 That 
assertion is erroneous because the district court specifically noted and recognized in the Order on 
122 R. Vol. II, p. 286. 
123 See Appellant's Brief, p. 29. 
124 R. Vol. II, pp. 288-93. 
125 R. Vol. III, p. 384. 
126 R. Vol. II, p. 283 (citing Drennon v. Fisher, 141 Idaho 942, 120 P3d 1146 (Ct. App. 2005); Clark v. Olsen, I 10 
Idaho 323, 326, 715 P.2d 993,996 (1986); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 2263 (2000)). 
127 Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 4 1,44, 122 P.3d 300,303 (2005). 
118 Appellant's Brief, p. 27. 
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Motion to Amend that the decision would be reviewed under an 'abuse of discretion standard.' 129 
Thus, plaintiffs' first argument fails because it incorrectly states the record on this point. 
Next, plaintiffs argue that discovery should have been permitted into the issues raised by 
the proposed amended complaint. 130 This ignores the fact that discovery had been commenced 
and the depositions of Tim and Julie Schelhorn, Piper Ranch and Big Bite had been 
completed. 131 In fact, it was these discovery methods which provided the alleged basis for 
plaintiffs' Motion to Amend in the first place. 132 It is unclear as to what additional discovery 
plaintiffs could even contemplate with respect to its proposed amendment. 
Plaintiffs' argument also ignores the district court's contemporaneous Order on Big Bite 
Excavation, Inc. 's August 6, 2009 Motion for Summary Judgment. In that decision, the district 
court correctly concluded that Big Bite was not a party to the Assignment Agreement, that there 
was a "complete lack of evidence" that Big Bite was obligated to perform Piper Ranch's 
obligations, or that the Schelhorns ever intended to bind Big Bite in any way. 133 
The district court further noted in the Order on Motion for Clarification that plaintiffs 
"failed to show a unity of interest or ownership between Piper Ranch and Big Bite.,,134 In fact, no 
evidence was presented by plaintiffs on that point. On that basis, the district court correctly 
129 R. Vol. II, p. 283. 
130 Appellant's Brief, p. 29-30. 
I31 R. Vol. II, p. 289. 
132 R. Vol. II, pp. 225-26 (plaintiffs argued that "through the discovery process in this matter, it has become apparent 
that the Complaint in this matter should be amended to provide for full and equitable relief to the Plaintiffs. 
Particularly, by way of this Motion, WTLLC and LRI seek relief pursuant to Rule l5(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure to amend their Complaint to assert additional causes of action against Tim and Julie Schelhom, the sole 
owners, members and/or shareholders of Piper Ranch and Big Bite and against Big Bite."). 
133 R. Vol. II, p. 267-77. 
134 R. Vol. III, p. 384. 
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determined the claim against Big Bite was moot and did not abuse its discretion in not allowing 
plaintiffs to amend their complaint to include the claim of piercing the corporate veil/alter-ego 
against Big Bite 
Because plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion, the 
Order on Motion to Amend Complaint should be upheld. 
E. The district court properly awarded Big Bite Excavation, Inc. attorney's fees and 
costs 
Next, plaintiffs argue that the award of attorney's fees and costs should be vacated, "[t]o 
the extent the trial court is reversed" and Big Bite "can no longer be considered a 'prevailing 
party. ",135 Plaintiffs present no other argument to justifY overturning the district court's 
determination that Big Bite was entitled to attorney's fees and costs. 
Because it is expected that the above discussed decisions of the trial court will be upheld, 
no basis exists to challenge Big Bite's status as the prevailing party and the decision awarding 
Big Bite attorney's fees and costs should be upheld. 
F. Schism Ablution is not entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal 
Finally, plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. 136 
While defendants agree that the case involves a commercial transaction as contemplated 
by Idaho Code § 12-120(3), defendants dispute the assertion that plaintiffs will prevail on this 
appeal. Because plaintiffs are not the prevailing party, plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of 
135 Appellant's Brief, p. 34. 
136 Appellant's Brief, pp. 34-35. 
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attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) or Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. 
VI. 
ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAL 
On May 22, 2012, Defendants Tim and Julie Schelhorn filed their Motion and 
Memorandum for Attorney Fees and Costs, after being dismissed from the lawsuit. 137 Plaintiffs 
filed their objection. 138 The district court denied the defendants' request finding that the 
S h Ih '1" 139 C e oms were not preVaI mg parties. 
In the Memorandum Decision, the district court made the finding that "[n]either party 
prevailed overall on the multitude of issues or claims asserted against the other during these 
proceedings.,,140 That finding, which is the basis for the Court's conclusion the Schelhorns were 
not prevailing parties, is factually and legally incorrect. 
Defendants submitted a Motion for Reconsideration which the district court denied on or 
about November 8, 2012. 141 Tim and Julie Schelhorn now seek review of the district court's 
denial of attorney's fees. 
A. Standard of Review 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure entitle the prevailing party in a civil action to receive 
costs and attorney fees when those fees are provided for by statute or contract. 142 Determination 
of the prevailing party for purposes of awarding costs and attorney fees is within the sound 
137 S.R. Vol. III, pp. 319-44. 
138 S.R. Vol. III, pp. 345-61. 
139 S.R. Vol. III, pp. 374-81. 
140 S.R. Vol. III, pp. 377. 
141 S.R. Vol. Ill, pp. 414-19. 
142 Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(A); Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(e)(I). 
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discretion of the trial court. 143 In making its determination, however, the trial court must consider 
the result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties, whether there 
were multiple claims or issues, and the extent to which each party prevailed upon each issue or 
claim. 144 
B. The district court abused its discretion when it found that Tim and Julie Schelhorn 
were not prevailing parties and denied their request for attorney's fees and costs 
The term "prevailing party" is defined by Rule 54(d)(1)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. This Rule provides the following: 
[i]n determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to 
costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or 
result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties, 
whether there were multiple claims, multiple issues, counterclaims, third party 
claims, cross-claims, or other multiple or cross issues between the parties, and the 
extent to which each party prevailed upon each of such issues or claims. 
In light of this language, the Idaho Court of Appeals has instructed trial courts to 
"examine (1) the result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether there were multiple 
claims or issues; and (3) the extent to which either party prevailed on each issue or claim.,,145 
To determine whether Tim and Julie Schelhom prevailed in the litigation, a brief review 
of the pleadings is beneficial. The Schelhoms were made a party to this litigation on July 29, 
2010 when the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint was filed. 146 The only claim levied at the 
143 Deckerv. HomeguardSys., 105 Idaho 158, 161,666 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Ct.App. 1983); Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure 54( d)( 1 )(B). 
144 Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406, 411,659 P.2d 160, 165 (Ct.App. 1983); Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
54(d)(l)(B). 
145 Freeman & Co. v. Bolt, 132 Idaho 152, 162,968 P.2d 247 (Ct.App. 1998) (quotations omitted). 
146 R. Vol. II, pp. 310-20. 
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Schelhorns in the Amended Complaint is "Claim Five-Alter EgolPiercing the Veil.,,147 The 
Answer to Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial was filed August 5, 201 O. 148 The 
Schelhorns denied the claim of liability.149 The Schelhorns did not file a counterclaim against 
plaintiffs. 150 
The Schelhorns unquestionably prevailed on the only claim asserted against them - Alter 
Ego/Piercing the Veil. In fact, the district court found no evidence was presented indicating the 
Schelhorns failed to maintain economic separateness from Piper Ranch. 151 It was upon this basis 
that the district court granted the motion to reconsider the denial of summary judgment and 
dismissed the Schelhorns from the lawsuit. Because the Schelhorns successfully defended 
themselves in the action, it simply cannot be said that the Schelhorns are not prevailing parties. 
Therefore, it is an abuse of discretion for the district court to simply 'lump in' the 
Schelhorns with Piper Ranch as the district court did in denying the request for attorney's fees. 
The basis for dismissing the Schelhorns from the lawsuit was that the district court recognized 
that Piper Ranch is a separate and distinct entity from its members. It is inconsistent to make that 
finding, and then to comingle these separate parties in the analysis of 'prevailing party.' 
Comingling the co-defendants is also inconsistent with the dismissal and attorney fee 
award to Big Bite. The fact of the matter is that plaintiffs cast a wide net in its efforts to hold 
Piper Ranch liable for plaintiffs' alleged losses. The motivation in doing so was clear. That tactic 
147 R. Vol. II, p. 317. 
148 R. Vol. II, pp. 323-36. 
149 R. Vol. II, pp. 323-36. 
150 R. Vol. II, pp. 323-36. 
151 R. Vol. IV, pp. 723-24. 
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was unsuccessful as plaintiffs could not demonstrate that these additional defendants bore any 
liability. Further, the decision to include these peripheral parties only increased the cost and 
expense of all parties and of the court. 
Quite simply, it must be recognized that Tim and Julie Schelhorn are prevailing parties in 
the defense of the claim asserted by plaintiffs. They were undeniably successful in defending 
against the only claim asserted against them. They did not file a counterclaim against plaintiffs. 
Thus, the Schelhorns prevailed in every sense of the word. Further, the Schelhorns cannot be 
capriciously 'lumped in' with Piper Ranch for the prevailing party analysis as that would be 
inconsistent with the Court's dismissal of the Schelhorns from the lawsuit. Tellingly, once Big 
Bite and the Schelhorns were properly dismissed from the case, the lawsuit resolved within days. 
Therefore, the decision of the trial court determining that the Schelhorns were not prevailing 
parties was an abuse of discretion. 
VII. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL 
There is no dispute that the litigation centered on a commercial transaction. Idaho Code 
12-120(3) specifically allows for amounts due in any commercial transaction. Defendants believe 
they will prevail on the issues argued above and, as such, they are entitled to attorney's fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and l.A.R. 41. 
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VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfully request this Court to uphold the Memorandum Decision and 
Order on Defendants' Motion to Reconsider. The district court was presented with undisputed 
facts to support the decision that the Schelhorns maintained economic separateness with Piper 
Ranch. Further, attorney's fees should be awarded to Defendants on appeal pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 12-120(3) and LA.R. 41. 
Defendants respectfully request this Court find the district court abused its discretion in 
finding that the Schelhorns were not prevailing parties and in declining to award them attorney's 
fees and costs. This matter should be remanded to the district court for the purpose of 
determining a reasonable amount of attorney fees and costs for the Schelhorns' defense of the 
action. Further, attorney's fees should be awarded to Defendants on their cross-appeal pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) and LA.R. 41. 
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